Determining factors for the adoption of stock option plans in brazilian publicly traded companies

Authors

  • Geovanne Dias de Moura Professor, Graduate Program in Accounting and Administration at Universidade Comunitária da Região de Chapecó – Unochapecó
  • Edilson Sidnei Padilha Professor, Accounting/Administration Program – Coordinator of Accounting Program – Coordinator of Graduate Program in Accounting at Centro Universitário de Brusque - Unifebe
  • Tarcísio Pedro da Silva Professor, Graduate Program in Accounting at Universidade Regional de Blumenau (Furb)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v10i3.1361

Keywords:

Determinants, Adoption of stock option plan, Brazilian publicly traded companies.

Abstract

The objective was to identify the determining factors for the adoption of stock option plans in Brazilian publicly traded companies. Therefore, a descriptive research was developed by means of document analysis and a quantitative approach, using logistic regression. The sample consists of 158 companies, using data for the period from 2009 till 2012. The results evidenced an increase in the number of companies with stock option plans during the period. Among the factors company size, liquidity constraint, stock concentration, horizon problem, stockholder participation of CEO, dual function of CEO and chairman of the board, described in the literature as influences for the use of stock option plans, three were confirmed in the sample analyzed. The factors “current liquidity” between 2010 and 2012; “horizon problem” between 2009 and 2012; and “stockholder participation” in 2012, further evidence positive relations in the Brazilian context.

Author Biographies

Geovanne Dias de Moura, Professor, Graduate Program in Accounting and Administration at Universidade Comunitária da Região de Chapecó – Unochapecó

Ph.D. in Accounting and Business Administration from Universidade Regional de Blumenau (Furb)

Edilson Sidnei Padilha, Professor, Accounting/Administration Program – Coordinator of Accounting Program – Coordinator of Graduate Program in Accounting at Centro Universitário de Brusque - Unifebe

M.Sc. in Accounting from Universidade Regional de Blumenau (Furb)

Tarcísio Pedro da Silva, Professor, Graduate Program in Accounting at Universidade Regional de Blumenau (Furb)

Ph.D. in Accounting and Administration from Universidade Regional de Blumenau (Furb)

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Published

2016-08-02

How to Cite

Moura, G. D. de, Padilha, E. S., & Silva, T. P. da. (2016). Determining factors for the adoption of stock option plans in brazilian publicly traded companies. Journal of Education and Research in Accounting (REPeC), 10(3). https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v10i3.1361

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Vol. 10 No. 3 (2016): JULY-SEPTEMBER

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