Thirty Years of Research on Executive Compensation and Return to Shareholders
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v11i0.1622Keywords:
Executive Compensation, Shareholder Return, BibliometricsAbstract
Objective: In this paper, we investigate the bibliographic production on executive compensation and return to shareholders in the Brazilian and international scenarios, aiming to constitute a theoretical basis for the development of empirical research involving the theme. We chose the research by Jensen and Murphy (1990) as the starting point of the discussions on the subject. Method: Descriptive study with a bibliometric design. The elaboration of the research was was based on keyword searches through EndNote™ and SPELL - Scientific Electronic Library Periodicals, maintained in Brazil by ANPAD (“Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração”), as follows: i) Executive Compensation; ii) CEO Compensation; iii) Company performance, combined with the word Compensation and the corresponding terms in Portuguese in the Brazilian database. Results: The main studies published focus on the North American and British scenarios, especially professors Michael C. Jensen (Harvard University), Kevin M. Murphy (University of Southern California) and Martin J. Conyon (University of Pennsylvania). Professor Jensen participated in the study that marked the discussion on the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Murphy conducts research on the theme beginning in the 1980s, on the North American scenario, a period that also marks the beginning of Professor Conyon's studies, who focused on the British scenario. The three authors are a reference on the subject and, based on this highlight, studies were developed in other economic scenarios, such as Canada, Germany and most recently China. Contributions: We believe that the findings presented contribute to the development of new empirical studies, especially in countries where the issue is in full development or in areas where the interest in the subject emerges, adding these variables to contribute to a further understanding of the agency problem.References
Abowd, J. M.; Kaplan, D. S. (1999). Executive compensation: six questions that need. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7124
Alcouffe, A.; Alcouffe, C. (2000). Executive compensation: setting practices in France. Long Range Planning 33, pp. 527-543. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00053-4
Araújo, C. A. (2006). Bibliometria: evolução histórica e questões atuais. Em Questão 12(1); pp. 11-32.
Araujo, J. A. O.; Parisi, C.; Silva, A. F.; Nakamura, W. T. (2014). Remuneração de executivos e desempenho das companhias abertas brasileiras: uma visão empírica após a publicação da Instrução Normativa CVM 480. Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade 209; pp. 69-83.
Baker, G. P.; Jensen, M. C.; Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: practive vs theory. The Journal of Finance 42(3); pp. 88-102. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x
Barkema, H. G.; Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). Managerial compensation and firm performance: A general research framework. Academy of Management Journal, Briarcliff Manor, 41(2), pp. 135-146. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/257098
Beuren, I. M.; Silva, J. O. (2015). Evidenciação da remuneração variável dos executivos nas maiores empresas brasileiras listadas na BM&F Bovespa. Enfoque Reflexão Contábil 34(3), pp. 95-124. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4025/enfoque.v34i3.26154
Beuren, I. M.; Silva, M. Z.; Mazzioni, S. (2014). Remuneração dos executivos versus desempenho das empresas. Revista de Administração FACES Journal 13(2), pp. 8-25. DOI: http://sci-hub.cc/10.21714/1984-6975FACES2014V13N2ART1556
Brunello, G.; Graziami, C.; Parigi, B.M. (2001). Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy. International Journal of Industrial Organization 1(1), pp. 133-161. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00026-0
Camargos, M. A.; Helal, D. H.; Boas, A. P. (2007). Análise empírica da relação entre a remuneração de executivos e o desempenho financeiro de empresas brasileiras. Encontro Nacional De Engenharia De Produção, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil, 28.
Clarke, R. N.; Conyon, M. J.; Peck, S. I. (1998). Corporate governance and directors´ remuneration: views from the top. Business Strategy Review 9(4), pp. 21-30. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00079
Conyon, M. J. (1994). Corporate governance changes in UK companies between 1988 and 1993. Corporate Governance: An International Review 2(2), pp. 87-99. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.1994.tb00060.x
Conyon, M. J. (1997). Corporate governance and executive compensation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4), pp. 493-509. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01032-6
Conyon, M. J. (2011). Executive compensation consultants and CEO pay. Vanderbit Law Review, 64(2), pp. 399-428.
Conyon, M. J.; Core, J. E.; Guay, W. R. (2009). Are U.S. CEOs paid more than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from risk-adjusted pay. Review of Financial Studies 24, pp. 402-438. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq112
Conyon, M. J.; Gregg, P. (1994). Pay at the top: a study of the sensitivity of top director remuneration to company specific shocks. National Institute Economic Review 149, pp. 83-92. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/002795019414900107
Conyon, M. J.; Gregg, P.; Machin, S. (1995). Taking care of business: executive compensation in the United Kingdon. The Economic Journal 105(430), pp. 704-714. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13619469708581456
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2004). Compensation committees and CEO compensation incentives in US entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management Accounting Research 16(1), pp. 35-56. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2012a.) Executive compensation and corporate finance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2), pp. 1-51. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2012b). CEO turnover in China: The role of market-based and accounting performance measures. European Journal of Finance 18(7), pp. 657-680. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2012.676559
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2012c). CEO compensation and corporate governance in China. Corporate Governance an International Review 20(6), pp. 575-592. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2013). Executive compensation and corporate fraud in China. Journal of Business Ethics 112(2), pp. 187-201. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2390-6
Conyon, M. J.; (2014). Executive compensation and board governance in US firms. The Economic Journal 124(574), pp. 60-89. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12120
Conyon, M. J.; Leech, D. (1994). Top pay, company performance and corporate governance. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 56(3), pp. 229-247. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.1994.mp56003001.x
Conyon, M. J.; Murphy, K. J. (2000). The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom. The Economic Journal 110(467), pp. 640-671. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00577
Conyon, M. J.; Peck, S. I. (1998). Board control, remuneration committees and top management compensation. The Academy of Management Journal 41(2), pp. 146-157. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/257099
Conyon, M. J.; Peck, S. I.; Sadler, G. V. (2009). Compensation consultants and executive pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. Academy Management Perspectives 23(1), pp 43-55. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002
Conyon, M. J.; Sadler, G. (2001). Executive pay, tournaments and corporate performance in UK firms. International Journal of Management Reviews 3(2); pp. 141-168. doi: 10.1111/1468-2370.00060
Conyon, M. J.; Sadler, G. (2010). Shareholder voting and directors’ remuneration report legislation: say on pay in the UK. Corporate Governance an Internacional Review 18(4), pp. 296-312. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00802.x
Conyon, M. J.; Schwalbach, J. (2000). European differences in executive pay and corporate governance. In Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. Horst Albach (Ed.). Corporate Governance: ZfB-Ergänzungshefte (Vol. 1, pp. 97-114). Wiesbaden: ZfB-Ergänzungshefte
Copeland, T. E.; Weston, J.F.; Shastri, K. (2007). Financial theory and corporate policy. 4th ed. London: Pearson.
Cordeiro, J.; He, L.; Conyon, M. J.; Shaw, T. (2013a). Chinese executive compensation: the role of asymmetric performance benchmarks. The European Journal of Finance 19(6); pp. 484-505. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2013.769892
Cordeiro, J.; He, L.; Conyon, M. J.; Shaw, T. (2013b). Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 30 (4), pp. 1031-1058. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10490-013-9353-9
Dial, J.; Murphy, K. J. (1995). Incentives, downsizing and value creation at general dynamics. Journal of Financial Economics 37(3), pp. 261-314. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)00803-9
El Akremi, A.; Roussel, P.; Trepo, G. (2001). CEO compensation strategies: consequences on the structure and management of executive pay. Working paper, HEC Paris, nº. 741.
Elston, J. A.; Goldberg, L. G. (2003). Executive compensation and agency cost in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance 27, pp. 1391-1410. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00274-1
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88(2), pp. 288-307. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/260866
Fernandes, F. C.; Mazzioni, S. (2015). A Correlação entre a Remuneração dos Executivos e o Desempenho de Empresas Brasileiras do Setor Financeiro. Contabilidade Vista & Revista 26(2), pp. 41-64.
Firth M., Tam M., Tang, M (1999). The determinants of top management pay. The International Journal of Management Science 3(2), pp. 617-635. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-0483(99)00021-3
Funchal, J. A.; Terra, P. R. S. (2006). Remuneração de executivos, desempenho econômico e governança corporativa: um estudo empírico em empresas latino-americanas. Encontro Nacional de Pesquisas em Administração. Salvador, BA, Brasil, 30.
Garen, J. E. (1994). Executive compensation and principal-agent theory. Journal of Political Economy 10 (6), pp. 522-541. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261967
Gibbons, R.; Murphy, K. J. (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy 100(3); pp. 468-505. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3792
Gregg, P.; Machin, S.; Szymanski, S. (1993). The disappearing relationship between directors´pay and corporate performance. British Journal of Industrial Relation 31(1). Pp. 1-9. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.1993.tb00377.x
Hall, B. J.; Murphy, K. J. (2003). The trouble with stock options. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (3), pp. 49-70. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9784
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics 13(2), pp. 324-340. DOI: 10.2307/3003457
Jensen, M.; Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, New York 3(4), pp. 305-360. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Jensen, M.; Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago 98(2), pp. 225-264. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261677
Jensen, M.; Murphy, K. J. (2010). CEO incentives: it´s not how much you pay, but how. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 22(1), pp. 64-76. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2010.00262.x
Jensen, M.; Murphy, K. J. (2012). The earnings management game: it´s time to stop it [Working Paper n. 12-004]. Harvard Business School NOM Unit, Boston, United States of America. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1894304
Jensen, M.; Murphy, K. J.; Wruck, E. G. (2004). Where we´ve been, how we got to here, what are the problems, and how to fix them [Working Paper n. 44 / WEP. 2-117]. European Corporate Governance Institute, Bruxelas, Belgium.
Kato, T.; Kim, W.; Lee, J. H. (2005). Executive compensation, firm performance, and chaebols in Korea: evidence from new panel data. Discussion Paper Series. Bonn, IZA DP, n. 1783. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.03.004
Kaveski, I. D. S. S.; Vogt, M.; Degenhart, L.; Hein, N.; Scarpin, J. E. (2015). Fatores determinantes da remuneração baseada em ações de empresas brasileiras. Revista de Administração da Unimep 13(2), pp. 100-116. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15600/1679-5350/rau.v13n2p100-116
Krauter, E; Sousa, A. F. (2013). A Relação entre a Remuneração de Executivos e o Desempenho Financeiro das Empresas. Revista de Educação e Pesquisa em Contabilidade 7(3), pp. 259-273. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17524/repec.v7i3.988
Leonard, J. S. (1990). Executive pay and firm performance. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, Cornell, 43 (3), pp. 13-S-29-S. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523569
Machado, D. G.; Beuren, I. M. (2015). Política de Remuneração de Executivos: um Estudo em Empresas Industriais Brasileiras, Estadunidenses e Inglesas. Gestão & Regionalidade 31(92), pp. 4-24. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13037/gr.vol31n92.2088
Main, B. (1992). Top executive pay and company performance. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh.
Main, B.; Johnston, J. (I993). Remuneration committees and corporate governance. Accounting and Business Research 23(1), pp. 35-62. DOI: http://sci-hub.cc/10.1080/00014788.1993.9729903
McKnight, P. (1996). An explanation of top executive pay: a UK study. British Journal of Industrial Relations 3(1), pp. 557-566. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1996.tb00490.x
Miller, D. J. (1995). CEO salary increases may be rational after all: referents and contracts in CEO pay. Academy of Management Journal 38(5), pp. 1361-1385. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256861
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1), pp. 11-42. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6
Murphy, K. J. (1998). Executive compensation. SSRN Electronic Journal, v. 3b.
Murphy, K. J. (2011). The politics of pay: a legislative history of executive compensation [Working Paper n. FBE 01.11]. SSRN Electronic Journal, South Los Angeles, United States of America. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn
Murphy, K. J. (2012a). Pay, politics and the financial crisis. In: Blinder, A.; Lo, A.; Solow, R. Rethinking the Financial Crisis, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Murphy, K. J. (2012b). Executive compensation: where we are, and how we got there. In: Constantinides, G.; Harris, M.; Stulz, R. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, North Holland: Elsevier Science. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2041679
Murphy, K. J. (2013). Regulating banking bonuses in the European Union: a case study in unintended consequences. European Financial Management 19(4), pp. 631-657. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2013.12024.x
Murphy, K. J.; Jensen, M. C. (2011). CEO bônus plan: and how to fix them [Working Paper n. 12-022 / FBE 02-11]. SSRN Electronic Journal, South Los Angeles, United States of America. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn
Murphy, K. J.; Sandino, T. (2009). Executive pay and “independet” compensation consultants. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49(3), pp. 247-262. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1.1.318.1670
Murphy, K. J.; Sandino, T. (2012). Are consultants to blame for high executive pay? SSRN Electronic Journal. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133059
Pukthuanthong, K.; Talmor, E.; Wallace, J. S. (2004). Corporate governance and theories of executive pay. Corporate Ownership & Control 1(2), pp. 41-62. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2962-0
Quevedo-Silva, F.; Santos, E. B. A.; Brandão, M. M.; Vils, L. (2016). Estudo bibliométrico: orientações sobre sua aplicação. Revista Brasileira de Marketing 15(2), pp. 246-262. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5585/remark.v15i2.3274
Rosen, S. Contract and the Market for executives. (1990). Nobel Symposium (3542): 1-54. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3542
Silva, A. L. C.; Chien, A. C. (2013). Remuneração executiva, valor e desempenho das empresas brasileiras listadas. Revista Brasileira de Finanças 11(4), pp. 481-502.
Tinoco, P. P.; Rossi, G. A. S.; Portugal, G. T. (2015). Remuneração dos Executivos das Companhias Estatais e Privadas de Energia Elétrica com Maiores Ativos Listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança 18(3), pp. 142-161.
Van Essen, M.; Otten, J.; Carberry, E. J. (2012). Determinants of CEO Compensation and Managerial Power Theory: A Meta-Analytic Approach. Journal of Management 41(2). pp. 164-202. DOI: 10.1177/0149206311429378
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License, which allows the sharing of the work and recognition of authorship and its initial publication in this journal. This license allows others to distribute, remix, adapt, or create derivative works, even for commercial purposes, provided credit is given for the original creation.
b)There is no financial compensation to the authors in any capacity, for articles published in RePEc.c) The articles published in RePEc are the sole responsibility of the authors.