Transações com Partes Relacionadas em empresas com estrutura piramidal: uma comparação dos fatores explicativos nas controladoras e coligadas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v15i3.2900Keywords:
Transações com Partes Relacionadas, Estrutura Piramidal, Empresas Controladoras/Controladas, Empresas ColigadasAbstract
Objetivo: Na ausência de mecanismos para proteger acionistas minoritários, controladores poderão exercer benefícios privados, utilizando mecanismos como as Transações com Partes Relacionadas (TPRs) ou desvios de direitos. O objetivo deste artigo é analisar os fatores explicativos das TPRs, em empresas controladoras/controladas e coligadas com estrutura piramidal no Brasil.
Método: Os dados de TPRs foram obtidos por meio do Formulário de Referência para 153 empresas no período de 2010 a 2017. Mediante a estimação de regressões quantílicas, buscou-se encontrar os fatores (presença de estrutura piramidal, desempenho, valor da firma e governança corporativa) que mais explicam essas transações, tanto entre controladoras/controladas quanto entre coligadas.
Resultados: Para controladoras/controladas, os fatores explicativos das TPRs são os desvios de direitos, alavancagem, presença de acionistas estrangeiros e auditores independentes. Para coligadas, constataram- se efeitos da rentabilidade do ativo (ROA), tangibilidade e auditoria pelas Big Four.
Contribuições: O estudo contribui ao demonstrar que há um efeito da estrutura piramidal nas TPRs sem empresas controladoras/controladas e do desempenho nas coligadas, sendo que a governança não foi um moderador para mitigar conflitos de interesses. Portanto, abordaram-se temáticas pouco exploradas na literatura nacional e nos mercados emergentes, caracterizados por estruturas de propriedade concentradas, permitindo novos caminhos para as relações de agência.
Palavras-chave: Transações com partes relacionadas; Estrutura piramidal; Empresas controladoras/ controladas; Empresas coligadas.
References
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Almeida, M. R. de. (1987). Sociedades coligadas, controladas e controladoras (holding). Revista de Ciência Política; v. 30, n. 2 (1987). Retrieved from http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rcp/article/view/60140/58457
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Almeida, H., Park, S. Y., Subrahmanyam, M. G., & Wolfenzon, D. (2011). The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(2), 447–475. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.017
Almeida, H., & Wolfenzon, D. (2006). A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2637–2680. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01001.x
Andrade, L. P., Bressan, A. A., & Iquiapaza, R. A. (2014). Estrutura Piramidal de Controle, Emissão de Duas Classes de Ações e Desempenho Financeiro das Empresas Brasileiras. Brazilian Review of Finance, 12(4), 555–595. Retrieved from http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbfin/article/view/24499
Bebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. G. (2000). Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights. In Concentrated Corporate Ownership (pp. 445–460). University of Chicago Press.
Bena, J., & Ortiz-Molina, H. (2013). Pyramidal ownership and the creation of new firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 798–821. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.009
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., & Mullainathan, S. (2002). Ferreting Out Tunneling : An Application to Indian Business. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 121–148.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Pyramids. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2–3), 478–473.
Bhuiyan, M. B. U., & Roudaki, J. (2018). Related party transactions and finance company failure: New Zealand evidence. Pacific Accounting Review, 30(2), 199–221. https://doi.org/10.1108/PAR-11-2016-0098
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Bortolon, P. M. (2010). Determinantes e consequências das decisões de estrutura de propriedade: estrutura piramidal e unificação de ações. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
Cai, W., Zeng, C. C., Lee, E., & Ozkan, N. (2016). Do business groups affect corporate cash holdings? Evidence from a transition economy. China Journal of Accounting Research, 9(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2015.10.002
Carvalhal da Silva, A. L. (2005). Governança Corporativa e Decisões Financeiras no Brasil (Mauad). Rio de Janeiro.
Chen, W., Li, S., & Chen, C. X. (2017). How much control causes tunneling? Evidence from China. China Journal of Accounting Research, 10(3), 231–245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.10.001
Cheung, Y. L., Jing, L., Lu, T., Rau, P. R., & Stouraitis, A. (2009). Tunneling and propping up: An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 17(3), 372–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2008.10.001
Cheung, Y. L., Qi, Y., Raghavendra Rau, P., & Stouraitis, A. (2009). Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(5), 914–924. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.10.002
Cho, S., & Lim, K. M. (2018). Tunneling by Related-party Transactions: Evidence from Korean Conglomerates. Asian Economic Journal, 32(2), 147–164. https://doi.org/10.1111/asej.12146
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. . (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 81–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2
CVM. (2010). Aprova o pronunciamento técnico CPC 05 (R1) do comitê de pronunciamentos contábeis, que trata das divulgações sobre partes relacionadas. Rio de Janeiro.
Da Silva, Á. F., & Neves, P. (2018). Portugal: changing environment and flexible adaptation. In Business Groups in the West: Origins, Evolution, and Resilience (p. 592). Oxford University Press.
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365–395. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.520.9523&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Fang, J., Pittman, J., Zhang, Y., & Zhao, Y. (2017). Auditor Choice and Its Implications for Group-Affiliated Firms. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1), 39–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12276
Firth, M., Fung, P. M. Y., & Rui, O. M. (2007). Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the informativeness of earnings - Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26(4), 463–496. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.05.004
Gordon, E. A., Henry, E., & Palia, D. (2004). Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance. Advances in Financial Economics, 9, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09001-2
Granovetter, M. (2005). Business Groups and Social Organization. In The handbook of economic sociology (pp. 3–25).
Greene, W. H. (2012). Econometric Analysis (Vol. 2). New York: Pearson.
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators. Econometrica, 50(4), 1029–1054. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912775
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, G., & Palia, D. (1999). Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 353–384. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00085-X
Huyghebaert, N., & Wang, L. (2012). Expropriation of Minority Investors in Chinese Listed Firms: The Role of Internal and External Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(3), 308–332. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2012.00909.x
Jian, M., & Wong, T. J. (2010). Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(1), 70–105. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-008-9081-4
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90(2), 22–27. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.22
Kang, M., Lee, H. Y., Lee, M. G., & Park, J. C. (2014). The association between related-party transactions and control-ownership wedge: Evidence from Korea. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 29, 272–296. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.04.006
Khosa, A. (2017). Independent directors and firm value of group-affiliated firms. International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 25(2), 217–236. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-08-2016-0076
Kim, S. H., & An, Y. (2018). The effect of ownership-control disparity on the Chinese firm’s real activity earnings management. Pacific Accounting Review, 30(4), 482–499. https://doi.org/10.1108/PAR-01-2018-0003
Kirch, G., Procianoy, J. L., & Terra, P. R. S. (2014). Restrições financeiras e a decisão de investimento das firmas brasileiras. Revista Brasileira de Economia, 68(1), 103–123. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-71402014000100006
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate Ownership around the World Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517.
Lee, M. G., Kang, M., Lee, H. Y., & Park, J. C. (2016). Related-party transactions and financial statement comparability: evidence from South Korea. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 224–252. https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2014.957706
Lei, A. C. H., & Song, F. M. (2011). Connected transactions and firm value: Evidence from China-affiliated companies. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 19(5), 470–490. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2011.07.002
Machado, J. A. F., & Santos Silva, J. M. C. (2019). Quantiles via moments. Journal of Econometrics, 213(1), 145–173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.04.009
Magalhães, R. L. dos R., Pinheiro, L. E. T., & Lamounier, W. M. (2011). Fatores que Favorecem a Compreensão da Extensão da Divulgação sobre Partes Relacionadas – Estudo nas Companhias Listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa. Sociedade, Contabilidade e Gestão, 6(Especial), 22–37. https://doi.org/10.21446/scg_ufrj.v6i3.13249
Maheshwari, Y., & Gupta, P. (2018). Ownership structures and effects of related lending and loan guarantees on firm performance in business groups. Asian Journal of Accounting and Governance, 9, 77–86. https://doi.org/10.17576/ajag-2018-09-07
Matos, O. M. da S. P., & Galdi, F. C. (2014). O Impacto Das Transações Com Partes Relacionadas Na Performance Operacional Das Companhias Listadas Na Bm&Fbovespa. Contabilidade Vista & Revista, 25(2), 84–97.
Oda, P. (2011). Transações com partes relacionadas, governança corporativa e desempenho: um estudo com dados em painel. Universidade de São Paulo. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004
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2021-09-30
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Mendonça Flores, S. A., & Bernardi Sonza, I. (2021). Transações com Partes Relacionadas em empresas com estrutura piramidal: uma comparação dos fatores explicativos nas controladoras e coligadas. Journal of Education and Research in Accounting (REPeC), 15(3). https://doi.org/10.17524/repec.v15i3.2900
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